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POLICY NOTE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELIMINATING OR
RESTRICTING U.S. SENATE PRIMARIES UNDER THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
By Megan Duthie
I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago, Tennessee lent her signature to the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which altered
how a United States senator was chosen from legislative
appointment to popular choice.' Today, some political
factions are calling for a complete repeal of the
amendment,2 while others are taking smaller steps toward
entrenching more power within state legislatures at the
expense of the power granted to the voting public under the
Seventeenth Amendment. 3
Tennessee is one state that has taken steps toward
diminishing the role of the Seventeenth Amendment in the
1 RALPH A. RossUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 217 (2001).
2 See Charles C.W. Cooke, Repeal the 17th Amendment!, NAT'L REV.
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/341894/repeal-
17th-amendment-charles-c-w-cooke.
3 New Hampshire lawmakers failed at altering the candidate selection
process for senators in 2010. See John Celock, Senate Elections: New
Hampshire Lawmakers Propose Changes to Candidate Selection,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/14/new-hampshire-senate-
elections_n_1 149279.html; John Celock, Frank Niceley, Tennessee
State Senator, Proposes Partial End to Direct Election of U.S.
Senators, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/frank-niceley-
tennessee n_2616266.html [hereinafter Frank Niceley].
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selection of United States senators.4 As introduced earlier
this year, Senate Bill 0471/House Bill 0475 would remove
the primary election as the method for determining the
candidates for the general election and would replace it
with legislative nomination.5 Under the bill, the members
of the state legislature belonging to each party would
choose the candidate for their respective parties. 6
Although there is little discernible case law directly
addressing the constitutional protection of primary
elections, it is likely that, by leaving the general election
and the ultimate choice of United States senator in the
hands of the public, the proposed Tennessee legislation will
be valid under the Constitution. There is a chance,
however, that the law will be struck down if submitted to
judicial scrutiny, as it is in direct opposition to the
underlying objectives of the Seventeenth Amendment and
would remove a considerable amount of choice from the
people by placing it in the hands of the state legislatures.
While this would be considered desirable under the original
text and intent of the Constitution, it would not uphold the
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment.
H1. HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR PRIMARY ELECTIONS UNDER THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
On its face, the Constitution does little to address
the protection of primary elections for United States
senators, as the text itself omits any mention of the term.7
4 S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 0415,
108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
5 Id.
6 id.
7 See U.S. CONST.
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The Seventeenth Amendment, which requires the popular
election of senators, reads in its relevant part as follows:
The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of
two Senators from each state,
elected by the people thereof,
for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote.
The electors in each state
shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the
most numerous branch of the
state legislatures.8
Due to the absence of direct protection for the
primary, 9 it has been the province of the courts to
determine whether, and to what extent, the primary is
constitutionally protected.
In 1921, the Supreme Court heard Newberry v.
United States.'0  There, the Court addressed an issue of
campaign spending in a Michigan primary." The Court, in
preserving the Elections Clause as the congressional source
of electoral authority,12 determined that the primary
election, in determining the candidates for the general
election, "is in no real sense part of the manner of holding
the election."' 3  This narrow interpretation of the term
"manner of holding the election" led the Court to continue
as follows: "We cannot conclude that authority to control
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
9 See U.S. CONST.
0 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
' Id. at 244-46.
12 Id. at 248.
13 Id. at 257.
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party primaries or conventions for designating candidates
was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to
regulate the manner of holding elections."1 4  This
interpretation of the term has recently been questioned, and
recent decisions have suggested that the modern Supreme
Court agrees with a broader understanding of the term
"manner of holding elections" as those procedural elements
of holding elections.
In the landmark 1941 case United States v. Classic,
the Supreme Court established the extension of e ual
protection to the right to vote in a primary election. It
reads as follows:
Where the state law has made
the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice, or
where in fact the primary
effectively controls the
choice, the right of the elector
to have his ballot counted at
the primary is likewise
included in the right
protected by Article I, § 2.
And this right of participation
is protected just as is the right
to vote at the election, where
the primary is by law made
an integral part of the
election machinery, whether
the voter exercises his right
14 Id. at 258.
15 Zachary M. Ista, Comment, No Vacancy: Why Congress Can
Regulate Senate Vacancy-Filling Elections Without Amending (or
Offending) the Constitution, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 327, 336 (2011).
16 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
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in a party primary which
invariably, sometimes or
never determines the ultimate
choice of the representative. 17
Currently, primaries are unequivocally a part of the
procedure of choice in Tennessee, and thus, the right to
vote in the primary is equally rotected under Article I of
the United States Constitution. What this case does not
do, however, is establish the primary election as the
necessary model of choice for nominations for electing a
United States senator. The opinion is careful to recognize
the protection of the right to vote in a primary only where
the primary either effectively controls the choice of senator
or where it is by law made a part of the "election
machinery."l 9  Both the Constitution and the federal
government have long deferred to the states to determine
the method by which the states will elect their senators;20
however, the final draft of the Seventeenth Amendment
does not modify the congressional power to regulate "the
[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner of holding [e]lections for
Senators and Representatives." 21
Twenty-five years after the Classic decision, the
Supreme Court heard Tashjian v. Republican Party.22 The
Court found Connecticut's closed primary law, which
required voters in primary elections to be registered
members of the party, unconstitutional because it
unreasonably burdened a political party's free association
17 Id. (emphasis added).
8 See id.
19 Id.20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
21 Id.; see also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 252 (1921)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
22 Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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23
rights without a compelling government interest. The
Republican Party rule, which allowed independent voters
the ability to vote in party primaries, was thus
constitutional.24
While not directly addressing the protection of
primary elections generally, the Court did discuss more
broadly the rationale of constitutional protections. The
Court said, "The constitutional goal of assuring that the
Members of Congress are chosen by the people can only be
secured if that principle is applicable to every state in the
selection process."25 The Court ultimately held that "the
Qualifications Clauses of Article I, § 2, and the
Seventeenth Amendment are applicable to primary
elections in precisely the same fashion that they apply to
general congressional elections." 26 Therefore, because the
Republican Party rule did not disenfranchise voters that
would otherwise be able to vote "for the more numerous
house of the state legislature," it did not run afoul of the
Qualifications Clause. 27 This holding was adopted in the
framework developed by Classic in that it is applied
"[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part
of the procedure of choice, or where in fact the primary
effectively controls the choice." 2 8
The Third Circuit addressed the practical effect of
both Classic and Tashjian in Trinsey v. Pennsylvania.29
The court, in interpreting Classic and Tashjian, held
primary elections were not required under the Constitution
23 Id. at 229.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 227.
26 id.
27 Id. at 229.
28 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
29 See Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991).
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when filling a vacant senate seat mid-term.30 While the
Trinsey court was reluctant to issue a broad holding on the
constitutional protection of primary elections generally,31 it
did address the history of the Seventeenth Amendment and
the intent of those who ultimately passed the amendment
into law. According to the court, "[the author of the Senate
Report] made clear that he believed that the precise mode
of senatorial nomination and election was to be a purely
local question and that establishment of a primary system
was to be left to the states."32 The court further determined
that "there is no firm evidence [the authors of the
amendment] believed that they were tackling the political
machines by mandating primaries as well as direct election
of Senators." 33 Whether the Sixth Circuit will follow suit is
yet to be determined.
Ill. POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING THE DIRECT
ELECTION OF SENATORS
A. The Seventeenth Amendment
The Seventeenth Amendment was passed at a time
in which several political concerns outweighed the
Framers' intent of entrenching federalism within the
national legislative framework by delegating United States
senators to act as representatives of, and chosen by, state
legislatures. 34 At the time the Seventeenth Amendment
was passed, there were no primaries as exist today. 35 These
concerns have been addressed in the years following the
'o Id. at 234.
31 Id. at 231.
32 Id. at 230.
33id.
34 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
3 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).
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Seventeenth Amendment and still rightly exist as legitimate
concerns today.
One of the concerns the Seventeenth Amendment
aimed to address was the problem of legislative deadlock
within state legislatures. 3 6 The difficulty came about due to
a variety of factors involving the power vested in the states
to conduct their own affairs and the balanced two-party
system.3 7 This deadlock resulted in the failure of many
states to elect senators over a period of years leading up to
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. 3 8
A second concern included bribery of legislators
and corruption of senate elections.39 While the number of
senators investigated on bribery charges was relatively few
in comparison to the number of senators appointed, the
cases were heavily publicized, leading to a demand of
populist reform.40
B. The "Activist" Supreme Court
Beyond the history and intent of the framers, the
proponents of increased (or absolute) state power in
appointing senators argue that as a result of the decline of
federalism and inherent protection for state powers, an
"activist" Supreme Court has been required to step in to
protect state interests.41  Since the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 4 2 the Supreme Court has made a
series of increasingly "pro-state" decisions in order to
36 RossuM, supra note 1, at 183.
37 See id. at 184-87.
A table of legislative deadlocks in the appointment of U.S. senators
can be found at RossuM, supra note 1, at 187-90.
39 RossuM, supra note 1, at 190-91.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 id.
8
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maintain the federalist structure that was undermined by the
enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment.43
These decisions include:
Hammer v. Dagenhart, which
held the Federal Child Labor
Act invalid under the
commerce clause," and
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Company, in which the Court
found that Congress was
improperly penalizing
employers using child
labor.45 Bailey was decided
in the same year as Hill v.
Wallace, which invalidated
the Future Trading Act of
1921 as an unconstitutional
tax levied by Congress.46
These decisions evidenced
the Court's determination
that Congress was
overstepping its bounds in
enacting legislation that
ought to be the province of
the states.47 These decisions
have been described as
43 id.
4 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918), amended on
public policy grounds by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); RossuM,
supra note 1, at 236.
45 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36, 44 (1922); ROSSUM,
supra note 1, at 238.
46 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922); RossuM, supra note 1, at
238.
47 RossuM, supra note 1, at 236-38.
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"unfortunate"48 and
"imprudent" 49  by some,
coupled with stark criticism
of the actions of the Supreme
Court Justice Day. In writing
for the majority in Hammer,
Justice Day seemed wholly
unaware that there is simply
no historical evidence to
suggest that the people who
ratified the Seventeenth
Amendment intended to
transfer the power to protect
that original federal design
from the indirectly elected
Senate to an appointed Court
so that it might invalidate the
very measures now passed by
their democratically elected
Senate.5 o
Yet the Supreme Court continued to pass
increasingly pro-state decisions, invalidating laws
supported by the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government.5 The role of the Supreme Court in
supporting the original design of federalism and the
protection of states continues to this day.52
A second school of thought insists that the
ramifications of the Seventeenth Amendment are concerned
primarily with not a loss or decline in federalism but with
48 See id. at 238.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 241.
5' See id.
52 See RossuM, supra note 1, at 284-85.
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the relationships among the branches of the government.5 3
While the relationships surely have changed, they require
more understanding and deliberation than what is currently
afforded.54
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND
POLITICAL WISDOM OF THE STATE
LEGISLATURE CHOOSING CANDIDATES FOR
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF U.S. SENATORS
Of course, the proposed Tennessee legislation falls
short of calling for an absolute repeal of the Seventeenth
Amendment. By removing a step of the process in which
the voting public can choose, however, the law would
prove to be ultimately undesirable, bringing with it many
more problems than solutions.
The first is the question of constitutionality. At first
glance, the proposed law is constitutional, as there is no
mention within the Constitution itself of primary
elections. 5 However, the Supreme Court in Classic and in
later cases maintained that rights were protected when the
primary was included as a part of the "election machinery"
and as a part of the choice of the people, with deference
given to the choice of the states. Supreme Court
precedent suggests the pivotal issue, therefore, is whether
this law would remove the primary as a part of this
procedure of choice. If it does, then the law will remain
constitutional and the Seventeenth Amendment will not be
offended, as the public will make the final selection of a
53 Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347,
1349-50 (1996).
54 See id. at 1405.
55 See U.S. CONST.
56 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
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United States senator in a general election. If the proposed
law falls short of removing the selection of candidates from
the procedure of choice, it may be found invalid under the
Seventeenth Amendment under this reading of the Classic
holding.
Assuming the constitutionality of the proposed bill
withstands judicial scrutiny, there remains a question of
policy. By removing the selection of candidates from the
public domain and admitting it to the legislature,
proponents of the law suggest its benefits echo those of the
individuals who would repeal the Seventeenth Amendment
altogether. Those who would see it repealed cite an
increased need for reins on the powers of the federal
government, which, they argue, have been increasing at the
expense of the powers of the states, thereby undermining
federalism. 59 The Framers, in borrowing from the British
the model of the bicameral legislature, with the House of
Representatives and Senate resonant of the House of
Commons and the House of Lords, did not intend for both
chambers to be elected by popular vote.60 Rather, they
intended the House of Representatives to act as agents of
the people and the Senate to act with the voices of the
several states.61
Indeed, removing the public vote is a small step
toward the original intent of the Framers. According to the
bill's sponsor, "We've tried it this way for 100 years. It's
5 Id.
5 See Frank Niceley, supra note 3.
59 John W. Dean, The Seventeenth Amendment: Should It Be Repealed?
Why the Direct Election of Senators May Have Been a Serious Mistake,
and One That Helps Explain the Supreme Court's States' Rights Views,
FIND L. (Sept. 13, 2002),
http://www.writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dean/20020913.htm.
6 Id.
61 Id.
12
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time to try something different." 62  This would further
allow the State of Tennessee a greater part in the choice of
senator and allow the senator to act in the interest of the
state as an independent political entity.
There may also be fiscal benefits to eliminating
senatorial primaries. Elections for United States senators
can cost millions of dollars for the state to administer.63
Saving that money that pays for the primaries could allow
the state to direct it elsewhere; the time saved by those
voting in the primaries could be put to another use. There
would also be the reduction of costs for those wishing to be
considered for the general ballot, with proponents
suggesting that by avoiding a primary altogether, primary
consideration would be open to a greater number of
people. 64
Finally, it would allow state legislatures a larger
role in choosing senate candidates without the difficulty of
repealing a constitutional amendment. To amend the
United States Constitution, Article V requires an
affirmative vote of two-thirds of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, followed by a ratification
of three-quarters of state legislatures. 65
Unfortunately, these benefits do not outweigh the
negative repercussions of implementing such a plan. First,
allowing the legislature to select the primary candidates for
a general election will do very little to reestablish
62 Frank Nicely, supra note 3.
63 For example, the upcoming New Jersey special primary and special
election to fill the vacant seat of Senator Frank Lautenberg is estimated
to cost taxpayers about $24 million. John Celock, Objection to
Christie's $24 Million Senate Special Election Spreads Across State,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 20, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/new-jersey-senate-special-
election n_3474790.html.
6 Frank Nicely, supra note 3.
65 U.S. CONST. art. V.
13
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federalism as the ultimate choice of senator will be left to
the people of Tennessee.66 While the choice of candidates
would be determined by the legislature, there is little
guarantee that the candidates, if elected, would work to
promote the state's interest beyond what they currently do,
short of an additional mandate requiring them to do so.
This in turn would fail to remedy the actions of the
"activist" Supreme Court given their decisions supporting
and defending states' interests would continue to be
required.
Second, it would give legislators an additional
responsibility above and beyond those they currently have.
Tennessee legislators are in session a short amount of time.
Session begins each year on the second Tuesday in January
at noon and usually adjourns in late April or early May for
a total of ninety session days over a two-year period.67 The
addition of such a potentially time-consuming task would
take time away from their primary mandate-to make laws.
The additional task could then make the process of
selecting candidates much more politicized. In addition to
appealing to public sentiment to win the general election,
those wishing to become the candidate would undoubtedly
be required to be well-connected to state politics, the
politicians, and the party itself. This may result in better-
qualified individuals being placed on the ballot, as the
68
sponsor of the proposed Tennessee law has insisted.
However, it could also be argued that a primary in itself
results in more electable candidates on the final ballot,
having already been chosen by the voting public above
other party candidates. Additionally, the increased political
66 S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013); H.B. 0415,
108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
67 About the Tennessee Legislature, TENN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/about/ (last visited July 27, 2013).68 See Frank Niceley, supra note 3.
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pressure could also narrow the field of potential candidates
running under Democratic or Republican banners and to
enter the general election as Independents. 69
Finally, the proposed law would run afoul of the
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment-to give the voters of
the several states a dominant voice in the election of their
U.S. senators and to ensure a more democratic system of
election.70 Proponents will still argue that the intent of the
original Constitution validates their stance on the matter.71
Ratified by the states, the proposed bill will, the author
submits, potentially violate the Seventeenth Amendment
under the principles of Classic.72
Ultimately, taking away the ability of the public to
vote in primaries for their choice of party candidate in the
general election would leave voters feeling ostracized. In
this time of low voter turnout and general public apathy
toward elections,73 enacting legislation that would push
individuals away from the electoral process and leave them
feeling like their input is neither required nor desired would
be ill-advised. It should be the democratic goal of all
branches of government to engage the population in
political life, rather than shun them. For this reason, the
proposed Tennessee legislation should not pass.
69 The proposed legislation allows for minor parties to nominate a
person in accordance with the rules of the minor parties or by holding a
primary election. S.B. 0471, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2013); H.B. 0415, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
70 Amar, supra note 53, at 1354.
7 Dean, supra note 59.
72 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).
73 See Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvote.org/voter-
turnout (last visited July 16, 2013).
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